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THE CHALLENGES OF CRYPTOCURRENCY
ASSET RECOVERY
Andrew W. Balthazor*
ABSTRACT
Cryptocurrencies, like Bitcoin, present challenges to plaintiffs seeking
to recover these digital assets. No third-party intermediaries are involved in
cryptocurrency transactions, and there is no controlling authority that can
revoke or avoid a transaction once completed. The possessor of a
cryptocurrency’s private key—its password—has total and exclusive control
over the account’s assets. These digital assets cross jurisdictional boundaries
without impediment. The features of cryptocurrencies make it easy for
defendants to judgment-proof themselves and make these assets difficult to
recover after a court has entered judgment. This comment explains
cryptocurrency features relevant to asset recovery, explores pre- and postjudgment procedures as applied to cryptocurrencies, and suggests ways to
mitigate the risks of this potentially difficult-to-recover asset.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Paul Vernon of Cryptsy, a Florida-based cryptocurrency exchange, stole
more than 11,000 bitcoins in 2014 and fled to China.1 Affected customers
filed a class action suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida.2 The court ordered a default judgment against Vernon,
declaring the stolen bitcoins the property of the plaintiff class.3 But the
plaintiffs have been unable to recover the stolen currency.4 They know where
the funds are located: in bitcoin addresses, similar in function to a bank
account.5 But the victims cannot access the funds associated with those
addresses without the private keys: strings of characters that grant access to
those bitcoin addresses.6 The prevailing plaintiffs do not know the private
keys—and do not know anyone else who would know them—with the
exception of the thief, Vernon.7
Courts are limited in their power to force the illegitimate wielder of a
private key to return stolen cryptocurrency, due to the qualities of this
intangible asset.8 Cryptocurrencies’ only real-world footprint are the private
keys granting access to the funds, and then only if the private key is stored
somewhere tangible.9 Cryptocurrencies ignore physical borders, transaction
quantity limits, or other traditional currency controls. And cryptocurrency
transactions, once completed, are essentially irreversible due to the lack of a

1 Angela Morris, Judge Orders $30 Million in Bitcoin to Be Returned in Cryptocurrency Class
Action,
MIAMI
DAILY
BUS.
REV.,
Aug.
3,
2017,
at
A1,
available
at
https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/e067ba8f-6e83-4192-a430-dcc793182938/?context=1000516.
2

Id.

3

Final Default Judgment at 1–2, Liu v. Project Inv’rs, No. 9:16-cv-80060 (S.D. Fla. July 27, 2017),
ECF No. 123 [hereinafter Liu Final Default Judgment].
4

Morris, supra note 1.

5

See Liu Final Default Judgment, supra note 3, at 2.

6

See Morris, supra note 1.

7

Id. Cryptsy’s receiver hired a former employee to perform a tracing analysis of Vernon’s theft,
concluding that Vernon transferred cryptocurrencies to digital wallets under Vernon’s control. Affidavit
of Nicholas Mullesch (August 5, 2016) at 6–7, Liu, 9:16-cv-80060 (attachment # 1 to the plaintiffs’ motion
for entry of final default judgment) [hereinafter Mullesch Affidavit].
8
9

See Morris, supra note 1.

Max I. Raskin, Realm of the Coin: Bitcoin and Civil Procedure, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
969, 975 (2015).
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controlling authority that can undo transactions.10 Digital currencies are
freely transferrable from one digital wallet to another without need for a bank
or other third-party intermediary, unlike conventional currencies or
securities.11 Cryptocurrency is under the sole control of whomever has the
private key to a bitcoin address; only the person possessing the private key
of a receiving account has any power over the funds received.12
This new “digital gold” is particularly attractive to thieves, who need
only purloin the private key to gain control of hundreds of millions of dollars
in virtual wealth.13 Private keys are vulnerable to both cyber and traditional
theft.14 Thieves no longer need be concerned about physically breaking and
entering property, or fleeing a jurisdiction with their ill-gotten gains; they
simply need access to a private key for mere moments to complete a
cryptocurrency heist.15 And once a thief with a private key transfers digital
funds, those criminal transactions cannot be undone unless the recipient
account’s private key holder can be identified.16
The only method to return stolen cryptocurrency is to gain control of the
private key associated with the bitcoin address in which the currency stored,
which may be impossible. Bitcoin addresses are often anonymous.17 And
because a thief can transfer the funds to an account controlled by a physicallydistant person, that person—even if identifiable—may be out of reach by
whatever court asserted jurisdiction over the stolen cryptocurrency
litigation.18 In such a situation only the physical assets within the jurisdiction
of appropriate courts would be subject to a court’s judgment. Even assuming
the cryptocurrency thief had reachable assets, their value may be insignificant
compared to the value of the stolen currency.
Vernon’s Cryptsy victims faced this problem. They knew who
possessed the stolen currency, and which bitcoin addresses contained their

10 See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN PROJECT, 1,
http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
11

See Nakamoto, supra note 10, at 1.

12

Raskin, supra note 9, at 975.

13

Cryptocurrency values are volatile, but at the time of writing this the value of Vernon’s stolen
11,325 bitcoins was approximately US $142 million. bitcoin (USD) Price, COINDESK,
https://www.coindesk.com/price/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2018) [hereinafter COINDESK bitcoin Price].
14

See Raskin, supra note 9, at 977.

15

See id. at 989.

16

See Nakamoto, supra note 10, at 1.

17

See Nakamoto, supra note 10, at 6.

18

See Raskin, supra note 9, at 998.
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stolen bitcoins.19 But Vernon had fled to China, 20 leaving behind real-world
assets worth less than two percent of the value of the stolen bitcoins.21 Vernon
ignored the court’s jurisdiction, failing to respond to the action in any way. 22
Out of the country and out of reach, the court was powerless to force Vernon
to return or to surrender his ill-gotten gains.23
Cryptocurrency’s value and susceptibility to theft will attract criminals
at an ever-increasing rate. At least 10% of Bitcoin—the most prevalent
cryptocurrency in the world—has been stolen and recirculated.24
Cryptocurrencies are volatile but maintain significant real-world value.
Motivated thieves are creatively applying criminal schemes designed to
illicitly transfer this digital wealth.25 The lack of any method to undo a
cryptocurrency heist or provide an effective remedy to victims means that
once cryptocurrencies are lost, they may be lost forever.
This comment identifies the challenges presented by applying
conventional judgment enforcement and asset recovery procedures to
cryptocurrencies. It begins by providing relevant background regarding
cryptocurrencies. This includes cryptocurrency properties, how
cryptocurrencies interact with the financial system, and some common
characteristics of cases where quantities of cryptocurrency are held by
defendants or are subject to judgment. The comment then explores the
efficacy of existing asset recovery procedures applied to cryptocurrencies,
including procedures intended to prevent defendants from moving or hiding
assets, and why in many situations such procedures are unsatisfactory.
Finally, this comment suggests ways to mitigate the risks of an unsatisfactory
recovery when dealing with defendants possessing cryptocurrency.
II. UNDERSTANDING CRYPTOCURRENCY
Understanding the abstract characteristics of cryptocurrencies is
necessary to appreciate the limitations of asset recovery procedures as
applied to bitcoin. What follows is an introduction to the relevant features of
19

Morris, supra note 1; see Liu Final Default Judgment, supra note 3, at 2.

20

Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 10, Liu v. Project Inv’rs, No. 9:16-cv-80060 (S.D.
Fla. filed Jan. 9, 2017) (basing the allegation on Vernon’s ex-wife’s filings pursuant to their divorce, which
was contemporaneous with Vernon’s theft from Cryptsy and its customers) [hereinafter Liu Complaint].
21 See id. at 10–11 (basing allegations of Vernon’s net worth on Vernon’s affidavit filed pursuant
to his divorce: less than $2 million).
22

See Liu Final Default Judgment, supra note 3, at 1.

23

Morris, supra note 1.

24

See Raincoaster, Ten Percent of All Bitcoin in Circulation was Just Stolen, THE CRYPTOSPHERE
(Feb. 9, 2015), https://thecryptosphere.com/2015/02/09/ten-percent-of-all-bitcoin-in-circulation-wasjust-stolen/.
25

See Raskin, supra note 9, at 998 & n.217.
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cryptocurrencies and how these assets interact with the real world. This
includes a presentation of characteristics common to cases involving
recovery of digital currencies. The properties of cryptocurrencies and the
characteristics of cryptocurrency cases work in concert to make it difficult to
recover these novel assets.
A.

Bitcoin: The Original Cryptocurrency

Cryptocurrencies are mediums of exchange that exist as a compilation
of digital transactions. The first and most widely used such currency is
Bitcoin.26 All succeeding cryptocurrencies are based on the same technology
underpinning Bitcoin, and they share many of the same features.27
In 2008,28 Satoshi Nakamoto29 proposed Bitcoin as a peer-to-peer
system for exchanging value independent of any central authority.30
Nakamoto sought to create a system that would eliminate the need for a
trusted intermediary to negotiate payments.31 Such a system would allow
“non-reversible payments,” theoretically reducing transaction costs.32 It
would also eliminate the need for merchants to gather information from
customers, a need that exists only when merchants must submit the payment
information to a traditional third-party payment processor for verification of
funds.33
1.

Operational Features

Bitcoin has many features that serve to remove it from the sphere of
control of government. The owner of bitcoins has complete control over her
digital wealth, and no outside force can take bitcoins from an owner who
maintains integrity of their ownership.34 Bitcoin is decentralized and
democratic by design, operating without any central authority that can

26 FAQ, BITCOIN PROJECT, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq (last visited Feb. 19, 2018) [hereinafter
BITCOIN FAQ]. Throughout this Comment, the word Bitcoin is capitalized when it is used as the name of
the Bitcoin software itself. Lowercase type is employed when referring to individual units of value.
27

See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26.

28

See Raskin, supra note 9, at 971.

29

The identify of Satoshi Nakamoto is a mystery. See id. at 974 n.31. But see BLOOMBERG, SelfProclaimed Inventor of Bitcoin Accused of Swindling $5 Billion in Cryptocurrency, FORTUNE (Feb. 27,
2018), http://fortune.com/2018/02/26/craig-wright-bitcoin/.
30

See Nakamoto, supra note 10, at 1.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

See Raskin, supra note 9, at 977.
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enforce its will on users; any changes to the Bitcoin system are only
implemented by majority consent of all worldwide users running the
software.35 Transactions ignore political borders, are irrevocable absent the
consent of the possessor, and ownership of bitcoins is anonymous. Because
of the software’s mechanics, it is practically impossible for any government,
or any group, to control Bitcoin.36
The units of exchange of the Bitcoin system are bitcoins, an entirely
digital resource controlled only by those who generate or receive them.37
There are no physical “coins.”38 Instead, bitcoins are associated with an
address.39 Each address has its own alphanumeric designation, serving a
function like a bank account number.40 Knowing a bitcoin address allows
anyone to deposit funds into it. But to use the digital funds associated with a
bitcoin address, one must also possess the private key, which is a different
alphanumeric string of characters.41 Only the possessor of an address’s
private key may make withdrawals—outgoing payments.42
Bitcoin’s backbone is a distributed digital ledger known as a
blockchain.43 The Bitcoin blockchain contains a complete record of all
transactions.44 Determining the “account balance” for a Bitcoin address is
done by adding all incoming and outgoing transactions associated with the
address.45 The Bitcoin blockchain, which stores the digital ledger of
transactions, is a distributed database.46 It is distributed in the sense that many
copies of the same database reside on every computer running the Bitcoin
software.47 If a user attempts to send bitcoin from an address, the Bitcoin
algorithm validates that the user has the correct private key and the requisite

35

See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26.

36

See Catherine Martin Christopher, The Bridging Model: Exploring the Roles of Trust and
Enforcement in Banking, Bitcoin, and the Blockchain, 17 NEV. L.J. 139, 144–45 (2016) (describing as
“preposterous” the idea that any one group could accumulate the computing power necessary to reverse
transactions or make unilateral changes to the software).
37

See Raskin, supra note 9, at 975–78.

38

There are physical bitcoins that are gag gifts or “conversation pieces,” but they are extraneous
to the Bitcoin system itself. See Nermin, Hajdarbegovic, 10 Physical Bitcoins: The Good, the Bad and the
Ugly, COINDESK (Sep. 14, 2014, 4:15 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/10-physical-bitcoins-good-badugly/.
39

See Raskin, supra note 28, at 975.

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

See Nakamoto, supra note 30, at 2.

45

See Raskin, supra note 28, at 975.

46

Id.

47

See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26.
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bitcoins available for the transaction.48 Every computer running the Bitcoin
software conducts this validation on its copy of the distributed database.49
The validating computers compare their results via the internet.50
Transactions are only processed if the majority of the computers running the
software agree a transaction is valid.51 As the software processes transactions,
the transactions are added to the distributed ledger in batches known as
blocks, lengthening the chain of transactions maintained by every copy of the
distributed database: the blockchain.52
Without numerous computers running the Bitcoin software, the system
would be vulnerable to control by a single entity with sufficient computer
resources.53 The decentralized ledger model only works because Bitcoin has
an integrated feature that encourages broad adoption of the software: bitcoin
mining.54 Bitcoin mining is operating the Bitcoin software as a validating
computer, processing bitcoin transactions. To incentivize broad adoption of
the Bitcoin software by computers for validating transactions, bitcoin mining
generates new bitcoins for the bitcoin miner, adding to the global supply.55
Miners may also earn transaction fees paid by those conducting
transactions.56
Conducting Bitcoin transactions only requires that a user have access to
the software and be connected to the internet.57 She then may freely transfer
the digital assets to other Bitcoin addresses if the software validates those
transactions.58 Geographic or political borders are irrelevant; transactions
cross jurisdictions limited only by the reach of the internet.
Adding transactions to the blockchain is essentially irrevocable.59
Adding a new transaction that reverses the effect of a transaction is possible,
but only the possessor of a private key can do so. Without the private key,
the majority of the computers attempting to validate the transaction would
interpret the transaction as invalid. However, a single person or group could
gain majority control of computers running the cryptocurrency software and

48

See Raskin, supra note 9, at 975–76.

49

See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

See Nakamoto, supra note 30, at 8.

54

See id. at 4.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26.

58

See id.

59

See Nakamoto, supra note 30, at 1.
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then “validate” any transactions they wished.60 This type of “51% attack” is
impractical to execute if the cryptocurrency software is running on sufficient
numbers of computers.61 Asserting control over the Bitcoin software like this
is impractical, given the large number of computers running the Bitcoin
software.62 It is exactly this type of attack that bitcoin mining is designed to
prevent, by encouraging users to run the software to mine coins.
Accordingly, Bitcoin users cannot remove or reverse transactions if
made by accident or fraud. The received bitcoins are fully under the control
of the person who possesses the private key associated with the recipient
bitcoin address. The recipient is the only person who can return the funds.
There is no appeal and no authority to turn to that can help.
A consequence of Bitcoin’s blockchain—its distributed ledger, stored
on every computer running the Bitcoin software—is that all Bitcoin
transactions are public.63 Knowing a Bitcoin address allows one to know
every incoming and outgoing bitcoin transaction associated with the
address.64 Ownership of a Bitcoin address is anonymous within the
blockchain. This anonymity carries a substantial caveat:
[T]he anonymity is by no means perfect. Security experts
call it pseudonymous privacy, like writing books under a
nom de plume. You can preserve your privacy as long as the
pseudonym is not linked to you. But as soon as somebody
makes the link to one of your anonymous books, the ruse is
revealed.65
The distributed ledger allows tracing of bitcoin back to its generation, by
following the trail of Bitcoin addresses through which the bitcoin has
traveled.66
Bitcoin’s features support its design: to be a digital currency operating
outside the control of any central authority.67 The Bitcoin system’s mining60

See id. at 4.

61

Compare Daniel Cawrey, Are 51% Attacks a Real Threat to Bitcoin?, COINDESK (June 20,
2014, 6:42 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/51-attacks-real-threat-bitcoin/ (discussing the improbability
of a 51% attack on Bitcoin), with Kai Sedgwick, Verge is Forced to Fork After Suffering a 51% Attack,
BITCOIN.COM (Apr. 5, 2018), https://news.bitcoin.com/verge-is-forced-to-fork-after-suffering-a-51attack/ (reporting the successful 51% attack on a smaller, less-used cryptocurrency).
62

See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26.

63

Bitcoin Transactions Aren’t as Anonymous as Everyone Hoped, MIT TECH. REV.: EMERGING
TECHNOLOGY FROM THE ARXIV (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608716/bitcointransactions-arent-as-anonymous-as-everyone-hoped/ [hereinafter ARXIV].
64

Id.

65

Id.

66

See Adam Ludwin, How Anonymous is Bitcoin? A Backgrounder for Policymakers, COINDESK
(Jan. 25, 2015, 8:45 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/anonymous-bitcoin-backgrounder-policymakers/.
67

See Nakamoto, supra note 30, at 1.
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incentive model expands the number of validating nodes checking
transactions and maintaining copies of the distributed ledger. The
decentralized spread of the Bitcoin network, its autonomous consensus-based
transaction validation algorithm, and its lack of a centralized controlling
authority prevents any one group or government gaining control over the
Bitcoin network.
2.

Security Features

Bitcoin is subject to theft like any other asset.68 The Bitcoin system’s
decentralization and cryptographic-based security help maintain the system’s
integrity. But individual bitcoin accounts are only as secure as the possessor’s
private key.
Theft by manipulating the Bitcoin algorithm itself is unlikely, due to
Bitcoin’s decentralized consensus-based model.69 Bitcoin is only transferred
if the transaction is validated by a majority of the computer nodes running
the Bitcoin software; invalid transactions are rejected.70 New bitcoins,
generated by miners, are validated and added in a way that is impossible to
replicate artificially.71 Persons attempting to adjust the computer code
underlying the software and inject counterfeit transactions would find their
transactions invalidated by the majority of the computer nodes running
unadulterated versions of the software.72 Double-spending of the same digital
currency, or counterfeit creation of bitcoins, is thus impossible.73
Complex mathematical equations founded on cryptography protect
bitcoins possessed by individual owners, hence the name: cryptocurrency.74
Bitcoins associated with a bitcoin address can only be spent by those who

68

See Raskin, supra note 9, at 989.

69

See Nakamoto, supra note 10, at 8.

70

See id. at 3.

71

See id. at 4.

72

See id. at 2.

73

See id.

74

See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26.
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possess that address’s private key.75 It is theoretically impossible to crack a
private key.76 Bitcoin has no password recovery tools.77
Private keys are the one Achilles heel of the Bitcoin system. Thieves
can steal private keys, providing unfettered access to the associated digital
assets.78 Owners protect and store private keys in a variety of ways.79 Some
go low-tech: private keys written down on paper.80 Hard-copies of private
keys are impervious to cybertheft. Others store their private keys on offline
digital devices, likewise making them immune to hacking.81 Some owners
with substantial cryptocurrency assets under their control may split up their
private keys, placing different parts of the same key in separate locations.82
This prevents a single theft from compromising their digital hoard, deterring
thieves from attempting what would require a series of coordinated heists.
There are several digital wallet software options which can store numerous
private keys.83 These digital wallets are themselves protected by additional
layers of encryption, passcodes, and multi-factor authorization.84 For
example, one bitcoin owner wears a ring with an embedded code that grants
him access to his digital wallet.85 Digital wallets are stored either on remote
servers or locally, providing a tradeoff between convenience and security.86

75

Raskin, supra note 9, at 975.

76

See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26; see also Matthew Sparkes, The £625m Lost Forever - The
Phenomenon
of
Disappearing
Bitcoins,
THE
TELEGRAPH
(Jan.
23,
2015),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/11362827/The-625m-lost-forever-the-phenomenon-ofdisappearing-Bitcoins.html (“Security expert Bruce Schneier once ruled out an attempt to crack a 256-bit
key, of the type used by Bitcoin, by referring to the laws of physics: such is the magnitude of the problem.
Even an impracticably large computer consuming all the energy outputted by the sun couldn’t count the
number of possible combinations in several decades.”).
77 See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26 (“[L]ost bitcoins remain dormant forever because there is no
way for anybody to find the private key(s) that would allow them to be spent again.”).
78

Raskin, supra note 9, at 989.

79

See id. at 990–91 (describing storing private keys on paper stored in safety deposit boxes, in the
cloud, or on hard drives).
80

Id. at 990.

81

Securing Your Wallet, BITCOIN PROJECT, https://bitcoin.org/en/secure-your-wallet (last visited
Feb. 19, 2018) [hereinafter BITCOIN Wallet].
82 See, e.g., Secure Bitcoin Storage, COINBASE, https://www.coinbase.com/security (last visited
Jan. 1, 2018) [hereinafter COINBASE Bitcoin Storage] (describing how Coinbase, one of the largest
cryptocurrency exchanges in the world, secures its “bitcoin geographically in safe deposit boxes and vaults
around the world”).
83

BITCOIN Wallet, supra note 81.

84

Id.

85

Max Raskin, Meet the Bitcoin Millionaires, BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 12, 2013, 12:41 PM),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-04-10/meet-the-bitcoin-millionaires.
86

BITCOIN Wallet, supra note 81.
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Cryptocurrency Exchanges

Bitcoin has thus far failed to displace conventional payment systems and
currencies.87 The purpose of Bitcoin was to act as a medium of exchange
outside the control of governmental central banks, placing financial assets
completely within the domain of the owner.88 Achieving this purpose
required widespread adoption by merchants. But widespread adoption has
not happened.89 Purveyors of goods and services are reluctant to accept
bitcoin payments because of the asset’s volatility, high transaction fees, and
slow transaction times.90 Traditional payment systems are comparatively
cheaper and faster and conventional fiat currency is a more predictable store
of value.
If Bitcoin is not replacing other currencies or payment systems, it must
intersect with conventional currencies for people to make meaningful use of
their assets.91 Some owners transact bitcoins for traditional currencies by
locating interested parties using message boards or websites.92 This practice
can be cumbersome and prone to problems. It may take time to find another
person who meets desired terms. And because Bitcoin transactions are peerto-peer and do not involve a third party, any transaction is fraught with the
risk that if you send your bitcoins to another they may simply abscond with
the currency and disappear.93
Cryptocurrency exchanges offer a place to buy or sell cryptocurrencies
for conventional currencies.94 They attract a high volume of traders, like a
stock exchange.95 Many exchanges operate like a third-party escrow service;
the two traders exchange their assets with the exchange, and only once the
exchange has received the assets from both parties does the exchange release
funds to their respective new owners.96 Cryptocurrency exchanges operate by
charging a per-transaction fee and work with a variety of different digital and
87 Christopher, supra note 36, at 152 (observing that bitcoins are not a functional currency because
they are not used by enough people for bitcoins to be a medium of exchange).
88

See Nakamoto, supra note 10, at 1.

89

Christopher, supra note 36, at 152.

90

Id.

91

See Christopher, supra note 36, at 151.

92

See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26; e.g., LOCALBITCOINS.COM (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).

93

See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26; e.g., Hallie Detrick, Someone Stole 7 Bitcoins from Apple CoFounder Steve Wozniak, FORTUNE (Feb. 27, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/02/27/apple-steve-wozniakbitcoin-theft/ (“Wozniak sold the bitcoins to someone who paid for them with a credit card. The credit
card transaction was then cancelled before it cleared, leaving him with nothing to show for [it]. The credit
card number turned out to be stolen . . . .”).
94

See BITCOIN FAQ, supra note 26.

95

Christopher, supra note 36, at 151.

96

Id.
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fiat currencies. Cryptocurrency exchanges maintain fiat currency accounts
for their operations, as well as bitcoin and other cryptocurrency addresses as
necessary.
Cryptocurrency exchanges provide convenient methods to exchange
digital and conventional currencies using online accounts.97 These exchangemanaged accounts serve the same functions as digital wallets. And like digital
wallets, owners may protect cryptocurrency exchange accounts with
encryption, passcodes, and multi-factor authorization.98
Exchanges add vulnerabilities to the cryptocurrency ecosystem by
providing additional avenues of attack for thieves:99 the assets held by the
individual owners (accessible via their exchange-managed account), and the
assets held by the exchange itself.100 Cryptocurrency exchanges are
vulnerable to cybertheft because exchanges must be online to conduct
cryptocurrency transactions.101 Mt. Gox was the largest cryptocurrency
exchange in the world until it began collapsing in 2013.102 It lost 850,000
bitcoins due to hacking.103 Exchanges mitigate the risk of cybertheft by
keeping some portion of their digital assets offline, using private keys stored
away from the internet.104 Cryptocurrency exchanges are also prone to
familiar white-collar crimes: embezzlement and fraud.105 Vernon’s Cryptsy
customers learned this the hard way, when he embezzled the entirety of his
exchange’s assets to accounts under his personal control.106

97 See, e.g., How to Buy Bitcoin, COINBASE, https://www.coinbase.com/buy-bitcoin (last visited
Dec. 20, 2018).
98 See, e.g., How Can I Make My Account More Secure?, COINBASE: SUPPORT,
https://support.coinbase.com/customer/en/portal/articles/1447997-how-can-i-make-my-account-moresecure- (last visited Dec. 20, 2018).
99 Steve Stecklow, Alexandra Harney, Anna Irrera & Jemima Kelly, Special Report: Chaos and
Hackers Stalk Investors on Cryptocurrency Exchanges, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2017, 6:55 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-bitcoin-exchanges-risks/special-report-chaos-and-hackers-stalkinvestors-on-cryptocurrency-exchanges-idUSKCN1C42JV (“These exchanges, which match buyers and
sellers and sometimes hold traders’ funds, have become magnets for fraud and mires of technological
dysfunction . . . .”).
100 See Jason Tashea, What’s Actually Happening When a Cryptocurrency Gets Hacked?, ABA J.
(Feb.
28,
2018,
12:32
PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/lawscribbler/article/whats_actually_happening_when_a_cryptocurrency_get
s_hacked/?utm_source=feeds&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=site_rss_feeds.
101 See, e.g., Robert McMillan, The Inside Story of Mt. Gox, Bitcoin’s $460 Million Disaster,
WIRED (Mar. 3, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/03/bitcoin-exchange/.
102

Id.

103

Id.

104

See, e.g., COINBASE Bitcoin Storage, supra note 82.

105

See, e.g., Morris, supra note 1.

106

See id.
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III. ENFORCING JUDGMENTS AGAINST DEFENDANTS WITH
CRYPTOCURRENCY
A party seeking to recover cryptocurrency faces two sets of challenges.
Prior to judgment there is a risk that a defendant may attempt to judgmentproof themselves, preventing enforcement of a judgment debt by concealing
or transferring digital assets in such a way that may make the cryptocurrency
difficult to locate after a court enters judgment. And post-judgment, a
defendant may find herself frustrated by the fact that only the wielder of a
private key may control the use of cryptocurrency funds; not all wielders give
up that exclusive control willingly. Only certain pre-judgment and postjudgment remedies are applicable to cryptocurrencies. Some are more useful
than others, and a few are not applicable at all.
There have been relatively few civil actions involving cryptocurrency.
These cases include commercial disputes, fraud, bankruptcy actions where
the debtor possesses cryptocurrency, and actions against insolvent companies
in receivership.107 Many of these cases involve contracts for cryptocurrency
services or mining computers.108 Others involve theft or fraud.109 These cases

107 See, e.g., CFTC v. McDonnell, No. 18-cv-00361, 2018 BL 76558, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 6, 2018) (virtual currency fraud); Complaint at 1–2, SEC v. Montroll, No. 1:18-cv-01582 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 21, 2018) (securities fraud); Complaint at 31-38, Kleiman v. Wright, No. 9:18-cv-80176 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 14, 2018) (alleging conversion and misappropriation) [hereinafter Kleiman Complaint]; Class Action
Complaint at 1–2, Paige v. Bitconnect Int’l PLC , No. 3:18-cv-00058 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 29, 2018) (alleging
Ponzi and pyramid schemes); SEC v. Plexcorps, No. 17-cv-07007, 2017 BL 448742, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.
14, 2017) (securities fraud); Class Action Complaint at 1, Rensel v. Centra Tech, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-24500
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2017) (alleging securities fraud); Audet v. Fraser, No. 3:16-cv-00940, 2017 BL
364322, at *1 (D. Conn. Oct. 11, 2017) (alleging securities fraud); Liedel v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 16-81992CIV, 2017 BL 184681, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 1, 2017) (aiding and abetting a third party’s breach of
fiduciary duty); Alexander v. BF Labs Inc., No. CV 14-2159, 2016 WL 6581460, at *1 (D. Kan. Nov. 7,
2016) (breach of contract); Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 206 F.Supp. 3d 1362, 1369-70 (N.D. Ill. 2016)
(tortious interference and fraudulent concealment relating to collapse of a cryptocurrency exchange);
Morici v. Hashfast Techs. LLC, No. 5:14-CV-00087, 2015 WL 4880670, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2015)
(breach of contract and fraud); FTC v. BF Labs Inc., No. 4:14-CV-00815, 2014 WL 7238080, at *1 (W.D.
Mo. Dec. 12, 2014) (breach of contract); Meissner v. BF Labs Inc., No. 13-2617, 2014 WL 2558203, at
*1 (D. Kan. June 6, 2014) (breach of contract); TradeHill, Inc. v. Dwolla, Inc., No. C-12-1082, 2012 WL
1622668, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2012) (enforcing arbitration agreement involving cryptocurrency
services).
108
109

See cases cited supra note 107.

See, e.g., Liu Final Default Judgment, supra note 3, at 1–2 (embezzling from a cryptocurrency
exchange); Order for Entry of Default Judgment at 1, SEC v. Garza, No. 3:15-cv-01760 (D. Conn. May
29, 2017) (operating a Ponzi scheme) [hereinafter Garza Default Judgment]; Hussein v. Coinabul, LLC,
No. 14-cv-05735, 2014 BL 358914, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2014) (promising gold or silver in exchange
for bitcoin, and not delivering); Lenell v. Advanced Mining Tech., Inc., No. 14-cv-01924, 2014 WL
7008609, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2014) (fraud involving failure to delivery mining machines); SEC v.
Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-416, 2014 BL 259471, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014) (running a bitcoin Ponzi
scheme).
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are useful to illustrate the challenges facing attorneys seeking to recover from
a defendant who holds digital currencies.
A.

Pre-Judgment Remedies

Ensuring a defendant has funds reachable by judgment enforcement
mechanisms is sometimes necessary to ensure satisfaction of judgments.
Judgment-proofing techniques prevent enforcement of judgment debts
designed to render any judgment difficult or impossible to collect from the
debtor.110 For example, a defendant may place assets in the possession of a
business entity or person whose assets are not subject to any potential liability
arising from the defendant’s conduct.111 Or a defendant may move assets—
and possibly herself—to a foreign jurisdiction that does not give legal force
to domestic judgments.112
Pre-judgment remedies are available to prevent a defendant from
executing some judgment-proofing tactics. However, a plaintiff seeking
purely monetary damages generally cannot ask a court to control a
defendant’s assets before judgment.113 This restriction is inapplicable if there
are claims for equitable relief, 114 such as specific performance or replevin, or
if there is a statutory basis for rescinding a fraudulent sale of a security.
If the facts of the case allow, plaintiffs seeking the return of their
cryptocurrency may allege a claim for replevin to ensure that equitable prejudgment remedies are available.115
1.

Preliminary Injunctions, Generally

Courts may preliminarily enjoin a defendant to prevent her from moving
assets to avoid judgment. Preliminary injunctions require notice to the
adverse party and an opportunity for the adverse party to be heard.116 In
certain situations, the court may grant preliminary relief without notice to the

110

See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 14 (1996).

111

Id. at 20–23, 30–32.

112

Id. at 32–33.

113

See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 321 (1999)
(following “the well-established general rule that a judgment establishing the debt was necessary before
a court of equity would interfere with the debtor’s use of his property”). But see Deckert v. Independence
Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290 (1940) (preliminary injunction of money assets proper where defendant
“was insolvent and its assets in danger of dissipation or depletion”).
114

See Desarrollo, 527 U.S. at 324–25.

115

See, e.g., Kleiman Complaint, supra note 107, at 34–35 (alleging replevin claim for the return
of approximately $10 billion in bitcoins).
116

See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a).
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other party on a showing of sufficient urgency by the party seeking the
injunction.117 A plaintiff must “establish that he is likely to succeed on the
merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.”118 Proving irreparable harm also means
proving that monetary damages are inadequate to compensate for the
injury.119 Courts sometimes grant preliminary relief when plaintiffs show a
defendant is effectively insolvent and will be unable to satisfy money
judgments.120
A plaintiff may be able to show imminent irreparable injury if a
cryptocurrency defendant signals their intentions that they are preparing to
hide or move assets. Signals of such an intention may include: liquidating or
gifting real-world assets;121 establishing accounts at foreign cryptocurrency
exchanges; making exaggerated or oscillating claims to disguise bad faith
conduct;122 and reporting hacks or other interruptions of their business
activity.123 This conduct, combined with the features of cryptocurrency that
make it difficult for a court to control and which enable fraud,124 may be
sufficient to show likely irreparable harm unless a defendant’s conduct is
enjoined.
Imminent irreparable harm may also be shown if the defendant signals
they are likely to ignore litigation altogether. Cryptocurrency is rooted in
anti-authoritarian ideals; the idea of a currency uncontrollable by any
government is attractive to those with an anarchistic bent. Some defendants
manifest this ideology during litigation by failing to meaningfully respond to
court orders or rules of procedures. Occasionally such a defendant will hire
an attorney, only for that attorney to withdraw as counsel after a period of
time, citing difficulties working with the defendant.125 Eventually, the court

117

FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1).

118

See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

119

See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 574 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).

120

See Deckert v. Indep. Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290 (1940).

121

See, e.g., Liu Complaint, supra note 20, at 7–9.

122

See, e.g., SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-416, 2014 BL 259471, at *3–*6 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18,
2014) (finding that the defendant made increasingly incredible claims as to how he was able to pay
“profits” in what was actually a Ponzi scheme, in order to attract new investors to sustain the scheme).
123

See, e.g., Liu Complaint, supra note 20, at 7–9.

124

See supra Section 0 and Part 0; see also Bitconnect Preliminary Injunction, supra note 158, at
7. See generally Scott Isaacson, The Bamboozling Bite of Bitcoin: Bitcoin Doesn’t Make White Collar
Crime Possible, but It Does Make It Easier!, UTAH B.J., July-August 2017, at 32–33.
125 See, e.g., Motion to Withdraw as Attorney for Defendants at 2, Hussein, No. 14-cv-05735
(N.D. Ill. filed Feb. 2, 2015) (defendants failing to meet obligations to attorneys and systemic failures to
communicate); Motion to Withdraw as Attorney for Defendants at 3, Lenell v. Advanced Mining Tech.,
Inc., No. 14-cv-01924 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2015) (defendants did not pay attorneys); Unopposed Motion to
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determines the defendant is ignoring the court and renders a default judgment
upon the plaintiff’s motion.126 Plaintiffs showing that the defendant is likely
to ignore court proceedings may be able to persuade the court that
preliminary injunctive relief is necessary to ensure that a defendant does not
hide assets in an attempt to judgment-proof themselves.
Two forms of preliminary injunctive relief warrant discussion in the
cryptocurrency asset recovery context: (1) asset freeze orders—court orders
preventing the disposal or shifting of assets—and (2) receiverships—placing
a business entity or assets under the control of a court-appointed receiver.
2.

Asset Freeze Orders

Courts may order a party to not sell or transfer assets under the control
using an asset freeze order, a form of preliminary junctive relief. The party
requesting the asset freeze must monitor for violations of the order. If a party
violates the order, they may inform the court, and the court will order the
enjoined party to show cause why she should not be held in contempt.
Asset freeze orders may include cryptocurrency assets.127 Defendants
could only dispose of cryptocurrency assets at the risk of contempt of court.
However, a plaintiff would need to know the bitcoin addresses of the frozen
cryptocurrencies to monitor for violations of the freeze order. An advantage
of the blockchain’s public distributed ledger is that a plaintiff armed with the
knowledge of the bitcoin addresses can determine the timing, amounts, and
destination accounts of any cryptocurrency transactions.
Plaintiffs successfully persuaded a court to issue a preliminary
injunction in Greene v. MtGox Inc., requiring defendants to freeze assets,
preserve data, and other ancillary remedies.128 The case arose from plaintiffs
seeking recovery of their lost funds due to the hacking and subsequent
collapse of the Mt. Gox cryptocurrency exchange.129 Mt. Gox and the bank it

Withdraw as Counsel for Defendants at 1, Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-416 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2014)
(defendants dismissing attorney).
126 Liu Final Default Judgment, supra note 3, at 1 (failing to respond to court); Garza Default
Judgment, supra note 109, at 1 (failing to respond to court); Motion for Default Entry at 1, Audet v. Garza,
No. 3:16-cv-00940 (D. Conn. Feb. 23, 2017) (requesting default judgment against some defendants who
failed to respond to complaint); Order of Default Judgment at 1, Hussein, No. 14-cv-05735 (N.D. Ill. Jul.
6, 2015), (failing to “appear, plead, or otherwise defend in this action”); Lenell, No. 14-cv-01924 (noting
in the docket that all documents served on defendants are returned undeliverable).
127 See, e.g., Order Freezing Assets and Granting Other Ancillary Relief at 3, Shavers, No. 4:13cv-416 (E.D. Tex. July 23, 2013) [hereinafter Shavers Freeze Assets Order].
128

See Temporary Restraining Order at 4–6, No. 1:14-cv-01437 (N.D. Ill. entered Mar. 11, 2014).

129

See supra notes 102–103 and accompanying text.

13 - BALTHAZOR.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

The Challenges of Cryptocurrency Asset Recovery

9/30/19 7:47 PM

1223

used for fiat currency transactions were in Japan.130 Plaintiffs argued that the
defendants were effectively insolvent and would be unable to satisfy a money
judgment, and that allowing the defendant to liquidate any other assets—for
example, transferring assets to the personal ownership of its operators—
would cause irreparable harm.131 Plaintiffs also argued that allowing a foreign
entity to preferentially dissipate assets at the expense of domestic consumers
would be to support a policy where foreign companies may feel free “to cheat
and steal from U.S. consumers with impunity.”132 The court agreed.133
The fact that defendants are in the process of selling cryptocurrency is
not sufficient to prove irreparable harm. In MacDonald v. Dynamic Ledger
Solutions, Inc., the court denied injunctive relief in a case involving
substantial amounts of cryptocurrency.134 Plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants were looting a company by liquidating massive amounts of
cryptocurrency and converting the assets into fiat currency, and that this
conduct would prevent them from adequate compensation in the event they
prevailed in their case.135 The court held that simply converting
cryptocurrency into conventional cash equivalents would not prevent the
plaintiffs from recovering under a favorable judgment, because there was no
evidence that the defendants were disposing the proceeds of the
cryptocurrency sales.136
Freeze orders may be ineffective applied to defendants undeterred by
the threat of contempt for violating the order. This is what occurred in
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Shavers.137 In that case, the court
ordered Shavers’ assets frozen, and ordered him to turn over all records so
that the SEC could account for his assets and prevent probable loss.138
Shavers never turned over the records.139 When the court held a show cause
hearing why Shavers should not be held in contempt—a year after the freeze

130 Motion for Temporary Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction at 22, Greene, No. 1:14cv-01437 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Greene TRO Motion].
131 See id. at 19-21; see also Deckert v. Indep. Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290 (1940)
(preliminary injunction of money assets proper where defendant “was insolvent and its assets in danger
of dissipation or depletion”).
132

Greene TRO Motion, supra note 130, at 22.

133

See Temporary Restraining Order, supra note 128, at 2.

134

No. 3:17-cv-07095, 2017 BL 456346, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017).

135

Id. at *3.

136

Id. at *4 (“The conversion of some portion of the volatile cryptocurrency assets into more
stable currency is unlikely to jeopardize MacDonald’s ability to recover the 18.145 Ethereum he
contributed (or its equivalent economic value) should he ultimately prevail.”).
137

No. 4:13-cv-416, 2014 BL 259471, at *14–16 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 18, 2014).

138

Shavers Freeze Assets Order, supra note 127, at 1.

139

Order to Show Cause at 1, Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-416 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2014) [hereinafter
Shavers Show Cause Order].
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order had been issued—Shavers claimed to have “loaned” over 200,000
Bitcoin to an anonymous person.140 He then claimed to have deleted all
records of the transaction, including the sending Bitcoin addresses under his
control.141 It only takes a moment to transfer cryptocurrencies. Shavers had a
year, and thus plenty of opportunity to transfer his cryptocurrency, worth
approximately $1 billion.142
3.

Receiverships

Plaintiffs may request appointment of a receiver as a method of
controlling a defendant’s assets, before or after judgment.143 Receivers are
court-appointed trustees that, inter alia, manage entities or assets when the
owners pose the risk of liquidating their assets for their own personal benefit,
and when the requesting party has a right or interest in the assets.144
Requesting receivership as a preliminary equitable remedy is subject to the
same restrictions as other preliminary injunctive relief, including the
requirement of a showing of irreparable harm.145
A receiver may oversee cryptocurrency assets like any other asset. This
requires either control of the private key that accesses the cryptocurrency, or
the defendant transferring the cryptocurrency to accounts under the receiver’s
exclusive control pending resolution of the litigation.146
4.

Avoiding Fraudulent Transfers

Plaintiffs unable to meet the requirements for a preliminary injunction
may seek avoidance of fraudulent transfers. Fraudulent transfer acts create
statutory causes of action to remedy the situation where defendants attempt
to dispose of assets that would otherwise be subject to a possible judgment.147
140

Shavers, 2014 BL 259471, at *11.

141

Id.

142

See COINDESK bitcoin Price, supra note 13.

143

See FED. R. CIV. P. 66.

144

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 607.1432(1), (3) (2018).

145

See supra Section 0.

146

Cryptsy was under control of a court-appointed receiver after Vernon had liquidated some
portion of the company’s assets and fled the country. But the receiver never had control of the company’s
bitcoin addresses. Vernon maintained that control and was stealing funds from those addresses even after
the receiver took control of Cryptsy. Liu Complaint, supra note 20, at 9–10; Mullesch Affidavit, supra
note 7, at 2–7 (“It appears that Mr. Vernon has transferred, and continues to transfer, a large amount of
coins traceable back to Cryptsy wallets to new addresses beyond the Receiver’s control after the
Receiver’s appointment.”).
147 Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 322 (1999) (“[T]here is
absolutely nothing new about debtors’ trying to avoid paying their debts, or seeking to favor some
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Such acts authorize courts to avoid fraudulent transfers, force the return of
assets, implement a receivership, or allow the use of other remedies as
appropriate.148
Forcing the avoidance of a fraudulent cryptocurrency transfer may be
difficult, even if one can identify the recipients of the transferred bitcoins.
This is because the transferred funds are under the sole control of whomever
possesses the private key of the recipient account.149 However, if a defendant
relies on third parties for parts of her bitcoin transfers—such as
cryptocurrency exchanges—or can identify the actual recipient, then a
plaintiff may be able to seek fraudulent transfer remedies against those
parties, if the party is within the court’s jurisdiction.150
B.

Post-Judgment Enforcement

Generally, enforcement of civil liabilities begins with the entry of a
judgment.151 The judgment creditor then requires a court’s writ of execution
to enforce the judgment.152 That writ of execution empowers local law
enforcement to levy—seize and sell property—to satisfy the judgment.153 A
judgment creditor may also pursue writs of garnishment or attachment,
granting the creditor a right to some or all of the judgment debtor’s wages,
property, or other debt owing in satisfaction of the judgment debt.154 These
writs may be served directly on the debtor, or on employers or banks to force
the payment of judgment debts.155 If the judgment creditor prevailed on a
replevin claim, then she may use a writ of replevin to have local law
enforcement seize and return the property at issue to the creditor.156
Cryptocurrencies are tailor-made to resist control by external
authorities, and this limits the efficacy of certain judgment enforcement

creditors over others—or even about their seeking to achieve these ends through ‘sophisticated . . .
strategies.’ The law of fraudulent conveyances and bankruptcy was developed to prevent such conduct
. . . .” (quoting id. at 338 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting))).
148

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 726.108 (2018).

149

See supra Section 0.

150

See, e.g., Complaint at 7–12, Kasolas v. Lowe, No. 3:15-ap-03011 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. filed Feb

17, 2015).
151

LoPucki, supra note 110, at 13.

152

FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(1).

153

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 56.21 (2018).

154

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 77.01 (2018).

155

See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 64(b) (listing available civil remedies for seizing property);
Carrie A. Tendler, Jef Klazen & Michael A. Sanfilippo, United States, in GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH:
1 ASSET RECOVERY 2018 (2014), Lexis 2018-1 GTDT: Asset Recovery (listing asset recovery options
available in civil cases).
156

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 78.01 (2018).
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mechanisms when the possessor resists surrendering the cryptocurrency.157
Whereas wages may be garnished by serving a writ of garnishment on an
employer, or a bank account may be seized by a writ of attachment served on
a bank, there are no analogous third parties that can grant control over
cryptocurrency.158
Several judgment enforcement procedures may be effective to recover
cryptocurrency from judgment debtors: levy, replevin, judgment liens, and
receiverships.159 The limited usefulness of contempt against cryptocurrency
defendants as an ultimate enforcement mechanism is also discussed.
1.

Execution, Levy, and Replevin

Judgment creditors may seize and sell property to satisfy a judgment,
pursuant to a writ of execution, by levy.160 A creditor levies property by
providing local law enforcement the court’s writ of execution and the identity
and location of property subject to levy.161 The local law enforcement levying
the property, often the sheriff, will then sell at auction the seized property to
satisfy the judgment debt.162
Plaintiffs succeeding on a claim for replevin—a demand for the return
of wrongfully taken property—may enforce the judgment in a manner similar
to execution and levy. However, instead of the sheriff selling property to
satisfy a money judgment, the sheriff returns the replevied property to the
rightful owner.163
Cryptocurrency may be seized, pursuant to a levy or writ of replevin,164
by taking the private key, granting control over the assets. This requires the
judgment creditor locating the private key, informing the sheriff, and the
sheriff taking the private key from its possessor. Seizure may be impractical
if a judgment debtor does not disclose a private key’s location pursuant to
discovery. Independently locating a private key may be difficult, because a
157

See supra note 30 and accompanying text.

158

See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7, Paige v.
Bitconnect Int’l PLC, No. 3:18-cv-00058 (W.D. Ky. filed Jan. 29, 2018) (arguing that the jurisdiction’s
attachment statute would be impractical or impossible to apply against cryptocurrencies), granted (W.D.
Ky. Feb. 9, 2018) [hereinafter Bitconnect Preliminary Injunction].
159

See section 0, supra, for analysis of receiverships applied to cryptocurrency defendants.

160

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 56.27 (2018).

161

See, e.g., How to Collect a Judgment in Florida, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE,
http://dos.myflorida.com/sunbiz/forms/judgment-lien/collect-judgment/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2016) (“The
sheriff’s department will not locate the property for you.”).
162

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 56.27 (2018).

163

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 78.01 (2018).

164

See, e.g., Kleiman Complaint, supra note 107, at 34–35 (alleging replevin claim for the return
of approximately $10 billion in bitcoins).
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private key may be stored on a device, a piece of paper, memorized, or even
divided up and placed in multiple locations.165 Even if the private key is
seized, the sheriff would need to transfer the funds to another bitcoin address
to prevent theft. Otherwise, a third party with access to a copy of the private
key could prevent the sale or return of the seized cryptocurrency by shifting
the funds out of the bitcoin address associated with the seized private key.
Because cryptocurrency is relatively new, a judgment creditor would need to
instruct local law enforcement what exactly is being seized and how to
protect it post-seizure so they may dispose of the property successfully.
2.

Judgment Liens

Tangible personal property may become subject to a lien upon execution
of a judgment.166 Jurisdictions vary in how a judgment creditor may enforce
their rights against a judgment debtor’s assets, but generally the lien is a
creation of a possessory interest in the liened property.167 Unless a statute
provides otherwise, judgment liens are not enforced against innocent
purchasers—those that have no notice of the lien—as a matter of equity.168
In such a circumstance, a lien creditor would need to avoid the transfer of the
property under a fraudulent transfer act or similar statute.169
Cryptocurrencies are subject to judgment liens in jurisdictions that allow
such liens on personal property. Courts addressing the issue treat bitcoins as
tangible personal property, controlled by a private key that is capable of
manifestation.170 Accordingly, judgment liens may allow a judgment creditor
to recovery cryptocurrency from a judgment debtor, possibly by enforcing a
lien against third parties to whom the judgment debtor transferred bitcoins.
The Bitcoin blockchain allows the tracing of bitcoin transactions.171
Using the public distributed ledger that is the backbone of Bitcoin, one can
track the transfer of bitcoins from address to address.172 Knowing the owner

165

See supra Section 0 (describing how private keys are stored).

166

See David Gray Carlson, Critique of Money Judgment Part Three: Restraining Notices, 77
ALB. L. REV. 1489, 1502 (2014).
167

See id. at 1502–03.

168

See D.C. v. Lyon, 161 U.S. 200, 206–07 (1896).

169

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 726.108 (2018).

170

See Raskin, supra note 9, at 983.

171

See MIT TECH. REV., supra note 63, at 3–4 and accompanying text; see also supra text
accompanying note 64; supra text accompanying note 65; Ludwin, supra note 66, at 3 and accompanying
text.
172

note 64.

See MIT TECH. REV., supra note 63, at 3–4 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying
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of an address allows tying these transaction records to a person.173 Users of
the infamous Silk Road discovered that their online transactions were
traceable, and that there was no way to erase these records embedded in the
blockchain.174 Silk Road was an online black-market clearinghouse for illicit
goods that accepted bitcoins as payment for anything from drugs to
assassinations.175 Determining the bitcoin addresses used by Silk Road
allowed criminal investigators to trace transactions through the blockchain to
accounts used by Silk Road customers.176
A plaintiff can use Bitcoin’s traceability to enforce judgment liens
against third parties who acquire illicit bitcoins from the judgment debtor,177
but tracing bitcoin transactions is difficult and requires some forensic
computing expertise. Tracing transactions from a Bitcoin address to a person
requires knowing the identity of a Bitcoin address’s owner.178 Bitcoin address
services that list some identifying information exist, but they rely on third
parties manually submitting reports of Bitcoin addresses.179 Such haphazard
databases will be imperfect and incomplete tools for identifying owners.
Furthermore, Bitcoin users now take measures to obscure their digital
trail. People learned from Silk Road and developed “best practices” to make
tracing transactions difficult. One such practice is to create many Bitcoin
addresses, limiting the use of one Bitcoin address to one incoming
transaction.180 Users can also “tumble” their outgoing bitcoin transactions,
combining transactions together using intermediaries to digitally launder
cryptocurrency.181 Tumbling allows users to place their funds in a combined
address, managed by a third party. That third party then distributes the funds
to their final destination for each respective customer. Without the internal

173

See MIT TECH. REV., supra note 63, at 2–4 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying

note 65.
174 See Andy Greenberg, Your Sloppy Bitcoin Drug Deals Will Haunt You for Years, WIRED (Jan.
26, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/bitcoin-drug-deals-silk-road-blockchain.
175 Andy Greenberg, Silk Road Mastermind Ross Ulbricht Convicted of All 7 Charges, WIRED
(Feb. 4, 2015, 3:57 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/02/silk-road-ross-ulbricht-verdict/.
176

Id.

177

Counsel for the plaintiffs victimized by Vernon’s cryptocurrency theft proposed just such an
approach: “I believe we are going to keep tracking down the users and trace the bitcoin through the
blockchain, and when someone tries to move some of it, we will hopefully locate the person.”“ Morris,
supra note 1.
178

Greenberg, supra note 174.

179

See, e.g., BITCOIN WHO’S WHO, http://bitcoinwhoswho.com/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2018).

180

See Chris Pacia, Innovations that Enhance Bitcoin Anonymity, BITCOIN NOT BOMBS (Feb. 5,
2014), http://www.bitcoinnotbombs.com/innovations-that-enhance-bitcoin-anonymity/ (suggesting that
the problems of a publicly viewable transactions can be “largely mitigated by treating all Bitcoin addresses
as one-time use addresses.”).
181 See Jeff John Roberts, Inside Uncle Sam’s Secret Bitcoin Hoard, FORTUNE (Feb. 21, 2018),
http://fortune.com/2018/02/21/government-forfeiture-bitcoin-auction/.
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records of the third-party tumbler, an outside observer cannot tell whose
funds are going to which account. This makes it nearly impossible to
determine where the bitcoin is being spent.182 And some newer
cryptocurrencies, based on the fundamental bitcoin technology, increase the
privacy of transactions by making it more difficult to use their blockchains
to trace transactions.183 The rise of these privacy-focused cryptocurrencies is
a response to the traceability of the original bitcoin software.
Courts are not likely to enforce judgment liens on innocent third parties
acquiring illicit bitcoin, even if there were reliable methods to trace bitcoin
transactions to identifiable people, because of the problem of notice in the
quasi-anonymous digital currency context.184 Enforcing judgment liens
against third parties generally requires that the third party have notice of the
lien prior to acquisition of the property in question.185 There is no mechanism
for putting potential bitcoin transferees on notice that the bitcoin they are
acquiring may have a clouded digital title. A lien holder would have to
independently put potential bitcoin transferees on notice based on their
knowledge of the judgment debtor’s relationships. But, because
cryptocurrencies freely cross jurisdictions, there is no reason to expect that a
judgment debtor would limit their transactions to their known contacts.
Judgment liens could serve to recover stolen cryptocurrency amid
certain conditions. Plaintiffs must identify likely third-party recipients of the
judgment debtor’s digital assets, based on information discovered about the
defendant’s financial dealings. Plaintiffs must serve those third parties notice
of a judgment lien on the cryptocurrency. The plaintiffs then will have to
identify transactions between the defendant’s cryptocurrency accounts and
the noticed third parties. If the plaintiffs identify such transactions, and the
third parties are in a jurisdiction that will give force to the plaintiffs’ judgment
lien,186 then the plaintiffs may recover from that third party.
3.

Contempt of Court

Civil asset recovery procedures are only effective if they are enforceable
against defendants. Defendants who do not comply with court orders are

182

Id.

183

Id.; Lucinda Shen, Bitcoins Worth $4.7 Million Seized in Fake ID Case, FORTUNE (Feb. 9,
2018) (“[C]riminals are gravitating toward other cryptocurrencies such as Litecoin or Monero instead of
Bitcoin, as investigators grow more savvy with tracking [Bitcoin].”); Greenberg, supra note 174
(“[N]ewer digital currencies like Monero and Zcash . . . promise far greater privacy by default.”).
184

See D.C. v. Lyon, 161 U.S. 200, 206–07 (1896).

185

Id.

186

Certain foreign jurisdictions do not enforce domestic judgments. LoPucki, supra note 110, at

32–33.
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subject to contempt of court. For example, if person refused a subpoena
ordering that a bitcoin private key be turned over, the court could hold them
in contempt.187
Contempt may be civil or criminal, with differing sanctions.188 Civil
contempt sanctions are designed to compensate the wronged party or coerce
obedience with the court’s orders.189 Civil sanctions may include monetary
fines or preventing the offending party from disputing related issues in the
case.190 Criminal contempt is reserved for punishing willful disobedience of
the court’s authority or when the underlying conduct is criminal.191 Criminal
contempt sanctions may include fines and prison.192 Typically, an alleged
offender has an opportunity to show cause why they should not be found in
contempt.193 However, imprisonment is not generally used in the United
States to enforce the repayment of debts, including enforcing court orders
necessary to collect those debts.194
Contempt is only effective at coercing compliance with court orders if
the defendant wishes to avoid potential contempt sanctions. A defendant may
ignore monetary sanctions if they feel they have more to lose by cooperating
with court orders than by being held in contempt.
Some defendants possessing cryptocurrency became suddenly and
unexpectedly wealthy due to the rapidly increasing value of these assets.
Defendants with immense digital assets in proportion to conventional assets
are more likely to risk contempt rather than expose their digital wealth to
potential seizure.195
Securities Exchange Commission v. Shavers illustrates how contempt is
ineffective against defendants with large digital holdings.196 In 2011,
Trendon Shavers set up a Ponzi scheme disguised as a bank.197 He accepted

187 See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(g) (“The court for the district where compliance is required . . . may
hold in contempt a person who, having been served, fails without adequate excuse to obey the subpoena
or an order related to it.”).
188 Elizabeth G. Patterson, Civil Contempt and the Indigent Child Support Obligor: The Silent
Return of Debtor’s Prison, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 102 (2008).
189

Id. at 102–03.

190

Id.

191

Id.

192

Id. at 103.

193

Id.

194

See LoPucki, supra note 110, at 9.

195

See generally SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-416, 2014 BL 259471 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014)
(illustrating one of the only examples of a contempt order issued relating to a cryptocurrency case, where
the defendant apparently protected approximately 200,000 bitcoins by ignoring court orders to disclose
his accounts, freeze assets, and repatriate funds).
196

See generally id.

197

Id. at *1.
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bitcoin investments in return for incredible interest rates, as high as 3,641%
annually.198 At one point during the scheme, Shavers had accumulated “about
seven percent of all the Bitcoin that was in public circulation at the time.”199
In 2012, he apparently siphoned off around 200,000 Bitcoin, deleted most
records of his transactions, and declared the scheme defunct.200 In its civil
case against Shavers, the SEC requested and received a court order
instructing Shavers to freeze his assets, to repatriate any assets he had
transferred away, and to give a full accounting of his assets (digital and
otherwise) and other discovery to the SEC for its case.201
Shavers did not comply with the court order.202 Shavers claimed that the
200,000 stolen Bitcoin were lent to an anonymous person whom he had never
met and could not identify.203 He stated that he could not provide any other
information about this fantastic transaction, because he had deleted all related
records.204
The court shared the SEC’s incredulity over these allegations and
ordered Shavers to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.205 In
the show cause order, the court limited its threatened contempt sanctions to
preventing Shavers from admitting evidence that would (essentially) allow
him to win his case.206 This was not sufficient to persuade Shavers to
cooperate. Eventually, the court ordered summary judgment against Shavers
because he simply had no credible facts to dispute the SEC’s claims.207 The
court ordered him to pay over $40 million, mostly in disgorgement to
compensate his victims.208 Shavers’ 200,000 lost Bitcoin are worth
approximately two billion dollars.209 That amount of money at stake may

198 U.S. Atty’s Office for S.D.N.Y., Texas Man Sentenced for Operating Bitcoin Ponzi Scheme,
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/texas-man-sentenced-operatingbitcoin-ponzi-scheme. The United States convicted Trendon Shavers of the theft of 146,000 Bitcoin and
sent him to prison in a case parallel to his Securities and Exchange Commission civil case. Id.
199

Id.

200

Shavers, 2014 BL 259471, at *7.

201

Shavers Freeze Assets Order, supra note 127, at 1.

202

See Shavers Show Cause Order, supra note 139, at 1 (“It appears that Shavers has willfully
refused to comply with: (a) the Court’s August 5, 2013 Order Freezing Assets and Granting other
Ancillary Relief; (b) the Court’s August 29, 2013 Order; and (c) his discovery obligations in this
litigation.”).
203

Shavers, 2014 BL 259471, at *11.

204

Id.

205

See Shavers Show Cause Order, supra note 139, at 1.

206

Id. at 2.

207

See Shavers, 2014 BL 259471, at *7 (“Shavers’ claims concerning the lending activity he
supposedly undertook . . . are not possible based on the record evidence in this action.”).
208

Id. at *12.

209

See COINDESK bitcoin Price, supra note 13.
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explain why contempt may not be effective against a defendant whose wealth
is largely digital and easy to hide.
IV. MITIGATING CRYPTOCURRENCY ASSET RECOVERY
CHALLENGES
Plaintiffs may improve their chances at recovering cryptocurrency
assets by incorporating lessons learned from other cases mixed with an
application of common sense. This includes extensive and stealthy precomplaint investigations and partnering with law enforcement or regulatory
agencies when possible.
A.

Pre-Complaint Investigations

Attempting to recover cryptocurrency from a defendant may be difficult,
but sufficient preparation prior to a complaint can improve your chances of
successful recovery. Because cryptocurrencies can be transferred almost
instantly, avoiding giving a defendant notice is important.
A lot of useful information can be gleaned prior to filing a complaint. If
plaintiffs transferred bitcoins to the defendant, they will have some records
that show the defendant’s receiving bitcoin addresses. Employing
appropriate forensic cryptocurrency experts may allow tracing of bitcoin
transfers from the defendants’ bitcoin addresses, mapping the defendants’
usual spending patterns.210 This is helpful to mitigate against a defendant’s
bad faith destruction of records, transfers of assets, and to establish the
identity of his normal vendors, if notice to those vendors of a judgment lien
were ever required.211
If pre-complaint investigations uncover evidence of crimes or securities
law violations, then that information may be provided to the appropriate
agency for action. Involving those agencies increases the chances of
successful cryptocurrency asset recovery.
B.

Using Law Enforcement and Regulatory Agencies

If the defendant or her digital assets arise out of criminal conduct, it
makes sense to cooperate with law enforcement or regulatory agencies at the
earliest stage possible. This will minimize the opportunity for defendants to
relocate digital assets or take measures to prevent disclosure of private keys.
If the defendant’s conduct violates laws enforced by regulatory agencies,
210

See Greenberg, supra note 174, at 2.

211

See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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then those agencies have statutory tools that make them effective at
preventing cryptocurrency defendants from moving their wealth using
preliminary injunctive relief, including receivers supported by forensic
computing consultants, asset freezes, and expedited discovery procedures.
Law enforcement agencies have investigative methods and are able to
exercise a degree of control over a defendant’s person and their property that
are unavailable to civil plaintiffs and increases their efficacy in recovering
stolen cryptocurrency.212
Additionally, national law enforcement agencies have a better
opportunity to attain discovery of foreign defendants’ assets, if the defendant
stores private keys or other assets abroad:
The United States has more than 70 mutual legal assistance
treaties (MLATs) with foreign nations that concern the
sharing of evidence. MLATs are typically employed by the
US to pursue its own law enforcement interests and are not
directly available to private litigants. Nevertheless,
coordination with US authorities can be used in pursuit of
information. If the government does make such a request,
then private litigants can utilise US discovery mechanisms
to attempt to obtain information after information is
produced in response to the MLAT request.213
Cooperating with law enforcement thus has benefits to civil plaintiffs in cases
involving domestic or foreign defendants, where those defendants are also
suspects in crimes.
Law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and DEA are much more
effective at recovering illicitly procured digital assets than plaintiffs relying
on civil actions alone. Law enforcement agencies do not need to wait on court
ordered contempt proceedings to force a suspect to disclose their assets or
provide access to their cryptocurrency.214 These agencies are becoming more
familiar with where to locate private keys, or how to convince a suspect to
surrender their private keys; law enforcement can threaten liberty in a way
civil plaintiffs cannot.215 The agencies transfer assets to law enforcement

212 See, e.g., Criminal Complaint at 1–14, U.S. v. Kim, No. 1:18-cr-00107 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 15, 2018)
(illustrating the ability of law enforcement to covertly collect information about a suspect’s activities,
including copies of text messages, that are not readily available to civil plaintiffs).
213

Tendler, Klazen & Sanfilippo, supra note 155, at 5.

214

E.g., United States v. 50.44 Bitcoins, No. ELH-15-3692, 2016 BL 171855, at *1–*3
(recommending that the Bitcoins be forfeited to the United States). See generally Raskin, supra note 9, at
980–83 (describing two criminal cases where the court ordered seizure of cryptocurrency assets).
215 Shen, supra note 183 (reporting that law enforcement is growing increasingly adept at tracking
Bitcoin transactions); Roberts, supra note 181, at 3 (“In private-key cases, the only way law enforcement
can quickly obtain the Bitcoin is if the suspect reveals the key.”).
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controlled bitcoin addresses, divesting access from the former possessor.216
After the coin is seized, victims may apply to the Department of Justice for
restitution.217
In 2013, federal law enforcement agents suspected Ross Ulbricht of
operating Silk Road.218 Silk Road was a multi-million-dollar digital
clearinghouse for drugs and other illegal goods and services.219 When they
arrested Ulbricht in a San Francisco library, they seized his laptop before he
had an opportunity to lock it and consequently recovered his bitcoin private
keys, giving the agents access to about 175,000 Bitcoins.220 Such a dramatic
seizure simply has no analog in the civil asset recovery toolbox.
Certain regulatory agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Federal Trade Commission, or the Commodities Futures
Trading Commission possess special tools to recover cryptocurrency assets
from defendants who violate laws under their purview. These agencies can
secure preliminary relief in situations where that relief may be unavailable to
private litigants. For example, the SEC, as a “statutory guardian charged with
safeguarding the public interest in enforcing the securities laws,” has a lower
burden to meet to secure preliminary relief in cases involving securities law
violations.221 The SEC does not need to show that irreparable harm would
result in the absence of the requested preliminary relief.222 Instead, the SEC
need only “make a prima facie showing that a defendant has violated the
federal securities laws.”223 Additionally, this different preliminary injunctive
burden for regulatory agencies allows them to secure ex parte preliminary
relief in contexts where a court would deny that relief to standard civil

216

See Raskin, supra note 9, at 982–83.

217

See Roberts, supra note 181, at 9.

218

Id. at 2–3.

219

Id.

220

Id.

221

Emergency Motion for Order to Show Cause, Asset Freeze, & Other Ancillary Relief at 9, SEC
v. Shavers, No. 4:13-cv-00416 (E.D. Tex. July 23, 2013) (citing SEC v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc.,
515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975)); see also SEC v. Plexcorps, No. 17-cv-07007, 2017 BL 448742, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2017).
222 Mgmt. Dynamics, 515 F.2d at 808–09 (“[T]he standards of the public interest not the
requirements of private litigation measure the propriety and need for injunctive relief.” (quoting Hecht
Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944)).
223 Emergency Motion for Order to Show Cause, Asset Freeze, & Other Ancillary Relief, supra
note 221, at 10 (citing CFTC v. Muller, 570 F.2d 1296, 1300 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Aaron v. SEC,
446 U.S. 680, 700–01 (1980) (interpreting the statutory basis for the SEC’s showing required to establish
preliminary injunctive relief); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t, 78u (2012).
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plaintiffs. Similar standards apply to the injunctions sought by the Federal
Trade Commission224 or the Commodities Futures Trading Commission.225
Regulatory agencies, taking advantage of their lower burden to secure
preliminary injunctive relief, are employing a multi-part strategy to prevent
defendants from hiding cryptocurrency. In SEC v. Arise Bank, the
Commission filed a motion to appoint a receiver for Arise Bank on the same
day as they filed their complaint, alleging securities fraud involving
cryptocurrencies.226 The court granted the order ex parte, limiting the risk
that Arise Bank would transfer cryptocurrencies to potentially unreachable
accounts.227 The next day the SEC filed a sealed motion requesting
appointment of cybersecurity and forensic experts in support of the
receiver;228 this motion was granted the same day, also under seal.229 This
strategy appeared to be successful, because after several days the SEC stated
that the case may proceed unsealed and then filed an amended complaint with
numerous documents supporting their allegations.230 Civil plaintiffs, required
to prove irreparable harm, may not be able to make the requisite showing to
achieve these same results under similar facts.231
V.

CONCLUSION

Cryptocurrency asset recovery poses challenges surmountable under the
right conditions. Covert pre-complaint investigation may produce the facts
necessary to present plaintiffs’ claims to law enforcement or regulatory
agencies, entities which have more tools to prevent possible judgment
proofing strategies. Educating the court about the qualities of cryptocurrency

224 See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2012); see also, e.g., Stipulated Interim Order at 1, FTC v. BF Labs,
Inc., No. 4:14-cv-00815-BCW (W.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2014).
225 See 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(a) (2012); see also, e.g., CFTC v. McDonnell, No. 18-cv-00361, 2018
BL 76558, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2018).
226 Complaint, SEC v. Arise Bank, No. 3:18-cv-00186-M (N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2018); Emergency
Ex Parte Motion to Temporarily Seal Docket & Proceedings, Arise Bank, No. 3:18-cv-00186-M;
Emergency Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, Asset Freeze,
Appointment of Receiver, Document Preservation Order, Order to Make Accounting & Other Emergency
& Ancillary Relief, Arise Bank, No. 3:18-cv-00186-M.
227

Ex Parte Orders Granting Emergency Ex Parte Motions, Arise Bank, No. 3:18-cv-00186-M.

228

Sealed Motion to Employ Kroll Cyber Security as Forensic Expert & Investigative Consultant,
Arise Bank, No. 3:18-cv-00186-M.
229 Sealed Order Granting Sealed Motion to Employ Kroll Cyber Security as Forensic Expert &
Investigative Consultant, Arise Bank, No. 3:18-cv-00186-M.
230 See Order to Unseal Case, Amended Complaint & Amended Documents, Arise Bank,
No. 3:18-cv-00186-M.
231 See MacDonald v. Dynamic Ledger Solutions, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-07095, 2017 BL 456346, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017) (denying a temporary restraining order because plaintiffs failed to show
irreparable harm).
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that make it difficult to recover if a defendant moves assets or hides the
location of private keys may justify preliminary injunctive relief to prevent
irreparable harm. Courts should consider that cryptocurrencies are uniquely
suited to evade control by design when balancing the equities and likelihood
of injury. Finally, extensive factual investigation of a defendant’s
cryptocurrency network and business contacts will afford plaintiffs the best
chance to recover under fraudulent transfer statutes or using judgment liens.

